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1 Introduction
The incumbency advantage is a well documented phenomenon, according to
which an incumbent politician is more likely to be reelected than a challenger
candidate. Empirical studies, such as Gelman and King (1990) and Lee
(2008), provide strong evidence in favor of the existence of such advantage
in the US House.1 Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) nd empirical support
for the incumbency advantage hypothesis also in US state executives. These
authors argue that this advantage does not originate in the strategic choices
made by incumbents but in their innate characteristics.2
The present paper provides an explanation to the phenomenon of incum-
bency advantage that focuses on a strategic mechanism that can potentially
constrain elected politicians. During his term in o¢ ce, the incumbent must
often implement some policies on new or emerging issues. These policies
may be costly in terms of chances of reelection if they are unpopular among
voters. The incumbent is thus facing implicit restrictions on the policies that
he can implement if he wants to remain in o¢ ce. We analyse the extent to
which incumbents will make policy sacrices during their time in o¢ ce in
order to enhance their electoral prospects. We show under which conditions
these implicit restrictions can be transformed into an advantage and help the
incumbent to be reelected.
Although our model is more general, we have in mind a specic type of
issues and policy choices as the origin of this potential incumbency disadvan-
tage: the outcomes of di¤erent forms of citizen direct political participation.
The outcomes of processes like referenda, citizensinitiatives or popular as-
semblies may constrain incumbents because their reaction to these proposals
factors into votersevaluation of the incumbents performance. This can cre-
ate a disadvantage compared to the case of an incumbent who does not face
such proposals. But also compared to the challenger, whose position does not
require him to make any pre-election choice and who, as a result, may have
1Other studies assume that incumbents have better ways to inuence votersdecisions
than challengers through di¤erent mechanisms such as redistricting (Levitt and Wolfram
1997, Cox and Katz 2002), seniority (McKelvey and Reizman 1992), informational advan-
tages (Krehbiel and Wright 1983), better access to campaign resources (Goodli¤e 2001,
Jacobson 2001), legislative irresponsibility (Fiorina 1989) or pork barrel politics (Cain,
Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000).
2In this line, Bevia and Llavador (2009) show that only good quality incumbents may
enjoy an advantage. Ashworth and de Mesquita (2008) show that incumbents quality
and ability are higher on average than the challengers. Gowrisankaran, Mitchell, and
Moro (2008) nd that incumbents face weaker challengers than candidates that face open
seats and Stone, Maisel, and Maestas (2004) nd that incumbentspersonal qualities deter
strong challengers from running for o¢ ce.
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a greater chance of winning unless the incumbent is ready to compromise.
We build a formal model of electoral competition with two candidates, two
issues and three stages. In the rst stage, the incumbent faces an exogenously
given policy proposal on a certain issue, the popular issue. This proposal is
non-binding so the incumbent can still choose which policy to implement in
this issue. The implementation of his choice on the popular issue takes place
during the legislature and before the next electoral campaign. In the second
stage, both candidates announce simultaneously their policy platforms on a
di¤erent issue, the electoral issue. The electoral issue is dened in the same
way as in most models of electoral competition; the candidateschoices in
this issue represent their campaign promises. Finally, in the third stage,
voters vote for their most preferred candidate.
The model presents two types of asymmetries. First, voters evaluate the
two candidates di¤erently. We assume that voters use all the information
they have available at the time of the election in order to decide who to vote
for. They evaluate each candidate according to their campaign promises.
When evaluating the incumbent, in addition to his campaign promises, they
take into account his choice on the popular issue during the legislature.
The second asymmetry refers to the two issues. Citizensevaluate the
performance of the incumbent on the popular issue by comparing his policy
choice with the proposal they had made to him. On the other hand, they
evaluate candidates on the electoral issue by comparing their own preferred
policy with each candidates political platform. In addition, they assign
di¤erent weights to the incumbents choices in each one of the issues.
The optimal policy choices of the incumbent in both issues reect the
trade-o¤ he faces between his own policy preferences and his chances of re-
election. We nd that for all parameter values the incumbent has a strategy
that allows him to be reelected. The question is whether this winning strat-
egy is always optimal for the incumbent. And the answer is no.
There are some instances where the incumbent prefers to forgo reelection
because obtaining it is too costly in terms of policy. In those cases, the
incumbent implements his ideal policy in the popular issue. For this to
happen three conditions must hold: (1) the incumbent must care enough
about policy, that is, the value of holding o¢ ce must be low enough; (2) there
must exist an intense conict of interest between voters and the incumbent
over the popular issue; and (3) competition on the electoral issue must be
strong, that is, voters must assign a high weight to the electoral issue when
evaluating the incumbent. The intuition for this result is the following: the
incumbent has a disadvantage whenever he does not satisfy votersdemands
on the popular issue. He will su¤er the smallest disadvantage at the electoral
competition stage when he fully satises citizensdemands on the popular
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issue. However, this is a costly strategy for a policy motivated incumbent.
If the incumbent is policy motivated he will choose the platform that forces
him to compromise as little as possible whilst guaranteeing reelection. But
when the conict of interests with voters in the popular issue is too intense
or competition with the challenger is very strong, this strategy becomes too
costly and the incumbent prefers to implement his ideal policy on the popular
issue and lose reelection.
Otherwise, in equilibrium the incumbent chooses a winning strategy that
consists of a combination of policies that depend on the weight that voters
assign to his performance on each issue. The larger the weight that voters
assign to the electoral issue, the more the incumbent will satisfy voters on
that issue. Perhaps more surprisingly, this is not the case for the popular
issue. The incumbent fully satises the votersdemands only when the weight
citizens attach to the popular issue is neither too high nor too low. This is
because the incumbent does not compete with the challenger in the popular
issue. Hence, when citizens care a lot about it, the incumbent can implement
a policy closer to his ideal one in this issue without jeopardizing his reelection.
This cannot happen in the electoral issue because there the incumbent has
to compete against the challenger.
The present work is related to the analysis of the e¤ect of popular initia-
tives on policy outcomes by Besley and Coate (2008). These authors study a
citizen-candidate model with two policy issues, one of which can be subject
to popular initiatives of the type that exist in some US states. Contrary to
our analysis, these initiatives bind politicians if passed . These authors show
that these type of policy proposals can sometimes improve the congruence
between citizenspreferences and policy outcomes. As in our case, the nal
e¤ect depends on the relative salience of the issues. However, Besley and
Coate (2008) do not analyse how initiatives a¤ect the reelection prospects of
incumbent candidates.
Our model relates also to the literature on spatial competition with va-
lence initiated by Stokes (1963) and later developed by Ansolabehere and
Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2002). In those
models, one of the candidates holds an advantage due to exogenous non pol-
icy factors, called valence factors, such as charisma, better campaign funds
or higher intelligence. The di¤erence between our model and these is that
in ours the origin of the advantage (if any) is endogenous. In our case, a
good performance of the incumbent in the popular issue provides him with
an advantage that has an e¤ect on electoral competition similar to the one
that valence factors have in the models just mentioned. This choice becomes
a source of disadvantage when the incumbent deviates too much from citi-
zenspolicy proposal on the popular issue. This trade-o¤ that incumbents
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face in our model is similar to the one that emerges in dynamic settings
with asymmetric information as in Reed (1994). In this context, Duggan
(2000) and Banks and Duggan (2008) endogenize the trade-o¤ between pol-
icy choices and re-election probabilities when elections are repeated, voters
are fully rational, the challengers preferences are privately known and policy
spaces may be multidimensional.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
discuss two real political mechanisms our analysis can apply to, namely ref-
erenda and participatory democracy. Section 3 describes the formal model.
Section 4 presents the results. The last section o¤ers some concluding re-
marks. All technical proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Two sources of incumbency (dis)advantage
During their term in o¢ ce, incumbents must make choices on new or common
value issues. These choices might have a large negative e¤ect on their chances
of reelection if they are unpopular because citizens will factor these choices
into their evaluation of the incumbents performance. Jeopardizing reelection
may not be optimal even for purely policy motivated incumbents. The policy
implemented in case they lose reelection may be worse for them than the
policy which could have granted them victory. Therefore, incumbents will
have to compromise on some dimension if they want to be reelected
Two mechanisms that can generate this trade-o¤ between policies and
reelection chances are referenda and participatory democracy. The charac-
teristics that both have in common are: (1) there is an issue that a signicant
part of the population considers to be very important; (2) the incumbent re-
ceives from citizens a policy proposal on this issue; (3) the incumbent must
make a decision regarding that issue; (4) there is a signicant proportion of
voters that may base their voting decision on that issue. Next, we elaborate
on how these two mechanisms t in our main argument.
2.1 Referenda and popular initiatives
Facultative (non-mandatory) referenda may be initiated by a public authority
or by some organized group of citizens. The latter case is known as popular
initiative. Referenda may be either binding or non-binding. A non-binding
referendum is merely or advisory. It is left to the government or legislature to
interpret its results and react to its outcome (even by ignoring it altogether).
If the incumbent chooses not to implement the policy corresponding to the
referendum outcome he may be punished by voters. Therefore, incumbents
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will tend to follow the proposal emerged from the referendum.
The empirical evidence on the e¤ect of referenda on congruence between
policy outcomes and citizenspreferences is quite strong. Cross-section stud-
ies for Switzerland reveal that policy choices regarding provision of public
goods correspond better with the preferences of voters in those cantons where
referenda are more extensively used (Frey and Bohnet, 1993; Frey, 1994).
Lutz and Hug (2006) run a cross-country study and nd that the policy ef-
fects of referenda carry over to the national level. We argue in this paper
that, apart from transmitting information about voterspreferences to can-
didates, referenda o¤er incumbents incentives to satisfy citizenspreferences.
Therefore, incumbents can obtain an advantage through them. However, we
also show in our model that incumbents will not be reelected if there exists
a substantial disalignment between them and voterspreferences. Empirical
evidence suggests that this disalignment between citizens and incumbents is
frequent, especially in the case of local public services, as shown by Agreen,
Dahlberg and Mork (2006) for a sample of Swedish municipalities. For the
case of Switzerland, Frey and Bohnet (1993) report that 39% of the referenda
held in that country between 1948 and 1990 yielded results that opposed the
views of the Parliament.3
Still, a referendum initiated by the incumbent might have a weaker ef-
fect on voters reaction than a referendum that originates with a popular
initiative.4 Popular initiatives sometimes take the form of legislative propos-
als that citizens can place in the ballot. This is the case in 24 US states,
where petitions by citizens are voted after obtaining a number of signatures
(between 2% and 15% of the voting population). Around 70% of the US
population lives in either a state or a city in which initiatives are permitted.
Popular initiatives are often regarded as an instrument that ensures a better
congruence between citizenspreferences and policy outcomes. Gerber (1996)
and Matsusaka (2005, 2010) nd indeed that laws passed in US states that
allow citizen initiatives reect more closely the preferences of their electorate.
Although these popular initiatives are binding, the reelection chances of an
incumbent candidate may still depend on whether the candidate endorses or
not such proposals.5 The available evidence suggests that popular initiatives
do provide incumbents with an electoral advantage. Bali and Davis (2007)
3More prominent examples are the two referenda called to decide whether the country
should join the UN and the EU in 1986 and 1992 respectively, which yielded a majoritarian
rejection (76% and 50%) despite the strong backing of all major political parties.
4Referenda called by the incumbent require them to perform strategy considerations
as to when is optimal to called them. Xefteris (2011) analyzes this issue.
5Actually, some popular initiatives may express discontent with the incumbent legisla-
tor or even aim to weaken him (Bali and Davis, 2007).
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show that in those US states which permit popular initiatives, incumbent
legislators enjoy a 1% to 2% higher chance of being reelected. These e¤ects
are small but signicant and suggest that although citizensproposals may
constraint incumbentsdiscretion, they can be used by them to obtain extra
electoral support.
2.2 Participatory democracy
Participatory democracy is an extended version of the system of represen-
tative democracy in which citizens make policy proposals through popular
assemblies. Real cases of participatory democracy can be found in the town
meetings of New England; in the village governance system of the Indian
states of Kerala and West Bengal; and in the participatory budgeting sys-
tem of nearly two hundred Brazilian municipalities, where popular assemblies
coexist with formal political parties and local elections. The most famous
experience of this kind started in 1989 in the city of Porto Alegre.6 Par-
ticipatory budgeting has also been applied to school, university, and public
housing budgets.
In all these cases, popular assemblies and deliberation emerge as gover-
nance mechanisms because citizens are interested on a certain issue, normally
a local one, and they would like certain policies to be implemented. Because
they care enough about these issues, their expected benets from participat-
ing in the process overcome the costs of coordinating in order to elaborate
a policy proposal. Typically, a policy proposal emerges from these meetings
and is submitted to the incumbent. The incumbent has formally complete
discretion regarding the policies he can implement. However, because the
support to these policy proposals is signicant within the population, the in-
cumbents chances of being re-elected critically depend on his policy choices
on that issue. Hence, participatory processes can give incumbents an oppor-
tunity to obtain electoral advantage
A few years after the participatory budgeting system was rst imple-
mented in Porto Alegre, critics of the system claimed that it was being used
as a partisan instrument by the ruling party, the WorkersParty. As a matter
of fact, the party had won all municipal elections since 1989 by wide mar-
gins. Most studies indicate that the incumbent party did enjoy an advantage,
as suggested by the higher levels of income redistribution and the patterns
of citizen participation in the process (Aragones and Sanchez-Pages, 2009).
However, the WorkersParty candidate was not reelected in the 2002 state
6The implications of participatory democracy on the behavior of citizens and politicians
and on policy outcomes are analyzed in Aragones and Sánchez-Pagés (2009).
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election. What was the di¤erence between these two scenarios?
As argued by Goldfrank and Schneider (2006), one key issue was the de-
gree of political competition. At the city level, the WorkersParty held strong
support in Porto Alegre, and it is likely that the popular issue was dominant
in votersminds when casting their vote in subsequent elections. However,
at the state level, the WorkersParty faced a much stronger opposition. In
our model, we explicitly incorporate this factor. Its results suggest that a
strong electoral competition erodes the electoral advantage that the incum-
bent could enjoy due to participatory democracy. Goldfrank and Schneider
(2006) computed the di¤erence between promised investments and actual
investments completed for each municipality under the WorkersParty rule
and then estimated a strong negative e¤ect of these dashed expectations on
the share of municipal votes of the party in the 2002 election. They show
that departure between actual policy choices and proposals severely under-
mined the advantage that the incumbent party might have enjoyed in these
municipalities.
3 The model
We assume that electoral competition takes place across two dimensions,
denoted by x and y. Each dimension is represented by the unit interval of
the real line [0; 1]: Dimension x represents the electoral issue and dimension y
represents the popular issue. There are two candidates: the incumbent and
the challenger. The model proceeds in three stages. The rst stage takes
place during the legislature: the incumbent receives a policy proposal on the
popular issue and has to implement a policy on that issue. Both the policy
proposed to the incumbent and the policy implemented by him on the popular
issue are common knowledge to all candidates and all voters. The second
stage is the electoral campaign: both candidates make policy announcements
simultaneously on the electoral issue. Again all policy announcements are
common knowledge to all candidates and all voters. It is assumed that the
winner implements the announced policy on that issue. In the third stage
of the game the election takes place: voters decide whether to reelect the
incumbent or vote for the challenger. The winner is selected by majority
rule and implements the policy announced on the electoral issue.
3.1 Candidates
The two candidates are denoted by L and R: Candidate L is assumed to be
the incumbent. Candidates have single peaked preferences over the electoral
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issue. Without any loss of generality we assume that the ideal point of
candidate L on the electoral issue is represented by xL = 0 and the ideal
point of candidateR is represented by xR = 1:We assume that the incumbent
has single-peaked preferences over the popular issue that are independent of
his preferences on the electoral issue. The incumbents ideal point on the
popular issue is represented by yL = 0: As we will argue below, it is not
necessary to specify the preferences of the challenger over the popular issue.
Let us denote by y(L) the policy chosen by the incumbent on the pop-
ular issue during the legislature. We assume the incumbent to be a unique
decision maker. Thus, the present model applies to scenarios where the
incumbent holds executive o¢ ce, or to legislatures where a party holds a
parliamentary majority and whose parliamentary representatives vote as a
unied bloc.7 Elections take place at the end of the legislature. When the
electoral campaign starts, this choice y(L) has already been made and it is
taken as given. We model elections by means of a standard model of electoral
competition on the issue x: the incumbent and the challenger simultaneously
announce policy platforms denoted by x(L) and x(R) respectively. We as-
sume full commitment, that is, the winner of the election will implement on
the electoral issue the policy he announced during the campaign.
We assume that candidates have preferences over policies but that they
are also o¢ ce-motivated. Candidatespayo¤s depend on the policy chosen
by the incumbent on the popular issue and the policy announcements of both
candidates on the electoral issue according to these utility functions:
UL =   jyL   y (L)j+ L (K   jxL   x (L)j)  (1  L) jxL   x (R)j ;
UR = (1  L) (K   jxR   x (R)j)  L (jxR   x (L)j) ;
where L = L(y(L); x(L); x(R)) represents the probability that candidate L
wins the election, and 1  L denotes the probability that candidate R wins
the election. The probability with which the incumbent is reelected depends
on how the game unravels, that is, it depends on the policy choices made
during the legislature (stage 1) and the policy announcements made during
the campaign (stage 2).
K is a non-negative number that represents the utility or ego rent of
holding o¢ ce. K = 0 implies that candidates do not obtain any extra utility
from holding o¢ ce, they only derive utility from the policy implemented. In
this case we would have two candidates that are purely policy motivated.
The larger the value of K the more candidates value being in o¢ ce. Thus
7Otherwise, it can be thought of as reduced form model of a more complex (and real-
istic) governmental system.
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for larger values of K candidates care more about winning. When the value
of K is high enough candidates become purely o¢ ce motivated.
Note that the incumbent obtains a negative payo¤ whenever he imple-
ments a policy on the popular issue that does not coincide with his ideal point
on that issue. Observe also that because we assume that the challenger has
no power over policy implementation on the popular issue before or after the
election, the policy choice of the incumbent on that issue y(L) has an non
reversible impact on his payo¤s. We elaborate more on this below.
For simplicity, we have assumed that the incumbent cares equally about
the two issues. Introducing a parameter in the incumbents payo¤ function
that represents the relative weight that each issue has on the incumbent
overall payo¤s would not change the main qualitative results obtained.
3.2 Voters
Voters have single-peaked preferences over the electoral issue x. We assume
that their ideal points are uniformly distributed over x, thus the ideal point of
the median voter on the electoral issue is xm = 12 : Let the ideal point of society
in issue y be denoted by ym > 0. The parameter ym is considered exogenous
in our model. It can be interpreted as the outcome of a referendum or of a
process of participatory democracy that took place before the beginning of
the game. Notice that since the ideal point of the incumbent on the popular
issue is assumed to be yL = 0; the value of ym measures the magnitude of
the conict of interests between the incumbent and the citizens with respect
to the popular issue. Here we assume that this proposal is exogenous. In the
nal section of the paper, we discuss the consequences of endogenizing the
policy proposal ym:
When facing the election, voters observe the policies announced by both
candidates on the electoral issue, x(L) and x(R), the policy implemented by
the incumbent on the popular issue; y(L); and then cast their vote. Voters
use all the information available in order to evaluate the two candidates.
Since they have di¤erent kinds of information about the performance of each
candidate, their decision rule must exhibit some sort of asymmetry.
We assume that voter i evaluates the incumbent according to the function
Vi (L) =   (1  ) jym   y (L)j    jxi   x (L)j ;
where  is a parameter that measures the relative weight that voters assign
to the electoral issue with respect to the popular issue, and 0    1:
Values of  close to one mean that voters consider the popular issue to be
very important. In this case, votersevaluation of the incumbent would not
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be much a¤ected by his policy choice on that issue. Values of  close to zero
mean that the popular issue is regarded as very important by voters and
that their evaluation of the incumbent will be strongly a¤ected by his policy
choice on the popular issue.
Note that voters evaluate the incumbent on the electoral issue by com-
paring his electoral platform, x(L); to their own ideal point xi. However,
they evaluate the incumbent on the popular issue by comparing the policy
he implemented, y(L); to the policy proposed initially by citizens ym: Hence,
citizens measure the performance of the incumbent on the popular issue in an
homogeneous way. This assumption is justied whenever the policy proposal
ym, represents the outcome of referenda, citizens assemblies or polls, that
is, when it represents the ideal policy on the popular issue of a substantial
subset of the electorate. Our assumption of common evaluation of the in-
cumbents performance in the popular issue can alternatively be interpreted
as an implicit commitment of citizens to punish politicians who do not follow
the proposals submitted to them.
On the other hand, voter i evaluates the challenger according to the
following function:
Vi (R) =   jxi   x (R)j :
Voters evaluate the challenger according only to his promises on the elec-
toral issue. The challenger could also make statements regarding the popular
issue that might be incorporated by the voters in their evaluation. However,
such statements are not actual facts as in the case of the incumbent, who had
to implement a policy such as an annual budget, a reform of the abortion
legislation, the participation or not in a war or the signature of an interna-
tional treaty. The challenger could without cost state that her preference
is fully aligned with ym: We are then assuming that information about the
popular issue, is only considered if it is hard information. We discuss the
consequences of relaxing this assumption in the nal section of the paper.8
Given votersevaluations of both candidates, voter i will vote for candi-
date L if and only if
Vi (L)  Vi (R) , (1  ) jym   y (L)j+ jxi   x (L)j  jxi   x (R)j : (1)
Notice that the lower the value of  the more weight past choices have
on the evaluation of the incumbent, that is, the more retrospective their
8The reader may argue that our evluation functions imply that voters evaluate x(R)
and x(L) di¤erently. This could be solved by assuming Vi (R) =   jxi   x (R)j. Note
however that in that case we would be imposing an incumbency disadvantage to start
with.
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decisions become.9 High values of  mean that voters barely base their
decision on past information, i.e. the performance of the incumbent during
the legislature. In addition, the performance of the incumbent on the popular
issue, i.e. the distance jym   y (L)j, has an e¤ect on voters evaluations that
is very similar to the e¤ect of valence factors.10
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 shows how citizensevaluation of candidates changes with the
platforms announced by them at the electoral stage. If the two candidates
were to propose the same platform the incumbent would su¤er a disadvan-
tage proportional to the distance between his choice y (L) and the citizens
proposal ym: On the other hand, citizensevaluation of the incumbent is less
sensitive to changes in his electoral platform x(L). This feature implies that
voters with ideal points at both extremes of the distribution may decide to
vote for the same candidate. In fact, when the distance between the pol-
icy implemented y(L) and the policy proposal ym is large enough, the set
of voters who decide to vote for the incumbent becomes non-connected and
the standard median voter analysis no longer applies. Expression (1) implies
that a citizen with ideal point xi = x(L) will vote for candidate R whenever
  1  jxi   x (R)jjym   y (L)j :
The set of voters who prefer to vote for the challenger but whose ideal
policy xi is closer to x(L) enlarges as citizens care more about the popular
issue and as the incumbents choice departs more from the policy proposal ym:
This highlights that the existence of a policy proposal during the legislature
can be a source of electoral disadvantage for the incumbent.
The present specication encompasses as particular cases some standard
models of two-party competition. If  = 1, that is, if voters care only about
the electoral issue, we have a standard model of electoral competition. In
this case, for very large values of K candidates are purely opportunistic and
the model describes a standard downsian framework. For relatively small
values of K; candidates become policy motivated, and our model reproduces
Wittmans (1983) model of electoral competition. On the other hand, the
case of  = 0, that is, if voters only care about the popular issue, boils down
9There exists a distinguished literature in which voters base their decisions on past
performance of parties. Examples include Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Austen-Smith
and Banks (1989) and Reed (1994).
10Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2002).
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to a more general version of our previous work on participatory democracy
(Aragonès and Sánchez-Pagés, 2009).
The incumbent is reelected if an only if the set of voters who prefer the
incumbent to the challenger contains a majority of the population.11 Since
the decisions on the two dimensions of the model are made sequentially,
one at each stage, we do not have to deal with the complexities of elec-
toral equilibrium in a multidimensional space. In fact, we can solve it as a
one dimensional model within each stage. In the next section we study the
equilibrium of this game for all values of the parameters K,  and ym.
4 Equilibrium results
4.1 Electoral stage
In order to solve the model described above we look for its subgame perfect
equilibrium by using backward induction. We start by analyzing the electoral
stage, taking as given the choice of the incumbent on the popular issue.
Citizens partially base their evaluation of the incumbent on his perfor-
mance in the popular issue. Hence, he does not enter the election on the
same grounds as the challenger. His choice on the popular issue will have an
impact on electoral competition, as the following lemma illustrates.
Lemma 1 If x (L) = x (R) ; then L obtains at least 1  2 jy (L)  ymj of the
votes and R obtains at most 2 jy (L)  ymj :
When both candidates choose the same position on the electoral issue,
that is when x (L) = x (R) ; only citizens at a distance of at least jy (L)  ymj
from the policy proposed by both candidates vote for the incumbent. Thus, it
is possible for the incumbent to capture the vote of extremists if he performs
well enough in the popular issue, that is, when jy (L)  ymj is small enough.
The incumbents chances of being reelected will be higher the less his policy
choice y (L) in the popular issue departs from the societys most preferred
policy ym. As a matter of fact, there exists a threshold on this distance that
is critical in determining whether the incumbent has an electoral advantage
or not, as the next proposition shows.
Lemma 2 If jy (L)  ymj < 1=4; then L wins in the equilibrium of the elec-
toral stage. Otherwise, R wins in equilibrium.
11That is, we assume that if there is a tie the incumbent is reelected.
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The incumbent obtains a decisive advantage when he compromises enough
on the popular issue. If, on the contrary, his policy choice on the popular
issue departs considerably from the proposal ym, then he has to compromise
so much on the electoral issue in order to win that he rather prefers to lose.
Let us now fully describe the equilibrium at the electoral competition
stage given a choice of y(L). The following two propositions characterize the
strategies used by the winner of the election in equilibrium. These strategies
dene the equilibrium policy outcome of the electoral stage as well. First,
we describe the equilibrium outcomes of the electoral stage for the case in
which the incumbent is reelected in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 If jy (L)  ymj  14 , then Ls equilibrium strategies at the electoral
stage are:
x(L) =
(
0 if jy (L)  ymj  1 34(1 )
3 1
4
+ 1 

jy (L)  ymj otherwise
This proposition illustrates the trade-o¤ that the incumbent faces. The
more he pleases the electorate on the popular issue, i.e. the smaller jy (L)  ymj ;
the closer his winning electoral platform will be to his ideal policy. The in-
cumbent can even guarantee his reelection by implementing his ideal point
on the electoral issue if he satises voters enough on the popular issue. In
order to achieve this, he will need to compromise more on the popular issue
the larger the value of the weight voters put on the electoral issue  (note
that 1 3
4(1 ) decreases with ).
Otherwise, if the incumbent implements a policy on the popular issue that
departs signicantly from the policy proposal ym, then the incumbent still
wins the election in equilibrium but his electoral platform x(L) includes
a certain degree of compromise. His electoral platform will lie somewhere
between his ideal point and the median voters ideal point. And it will be
closer to the median voters ideal point the larger the distance between the
policy he implemented in the popular issue y (L) and the policy proposal ym.
This equilibrium policy choice will also be closer to ym the more weight voters
put on the electoral issue or, in other words, the tougher the competition at
the electoral stage, which is represented by higher values of :12 In the limit,
when competition at the electoral stage attains a maximum, i.e.  goes to
1, the policy announced by the incumbent on the electoral issue coincides
with the median voters ideal point. By the same token, as the popular issue
becomes more important, i.e.  decreases, the policy announced by the
incumbent on the electoral issue approaches the incumbents ideal point.
12Straightfoward calculations show that @x
(L)
@ =
1
2
 
1
4   jy (L)  ymj
  0:
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The following proposition describes the equilibrium outcome of the elec-
toral stage when the incumbent decides to forgo reelection. In that case, the
equilibrium policy outcome in the electoral issue coincides with the strategies
used by the challenger in the equilibrium of the electoral stage.
Lemma 4 If jy (L)  ymj > 14 , then Rs equilibrium strategy at the electoral
stage is x(R) = 1
2
+ 1 
1+
jy (L)  ymj :
When the incumbent has departed signicantly from the citizensideal
point in the popular issue, the challenger wins with a moderate policy in the
resulting equilibrium of the electoral stage. Observe that x(R) is decreasing
in  so, as before, the tougher the competition at the electoral stage the
closer the policy outcome will be to the median voters ideal point. And the
larger the distance between the policy proposal and the policy implemented
on the popular issue, the closer the policy outcome on the electoral issue will
be to the challengers ideal point.
4.2 The popular issue
After solving for the equilibrium strategies of the electoral stage, we move
backward in order to nd the incumbents optimal policy at the rst stage.
Recall that when the incumbent is choosing which policy to implement
on the popular issue he is facing a trade-o¤. If he implements a policy y(L)
that is relatively close to the citizensproposal, ym; he will be able to get
reelected with an electoral platform relatively close to his ideal policy. The
closer his choice y(L) is to his own ideal policy on the popular issue, that is,
the more his choice departs from ym, the more he will have to compromise
on the electoral issue if he wants to remain in o¢ ce. This strategy may be
too costly if the incumbent is su¢ ciently policy motivated. Instead, he can
implement his most preferred policy on the popular issue and forgo reelection.
The next few results characterize this trade-o¤. First we nd the best winning
strategies and best losing strategies for the incumbent. Then we show under
which conditions the incumbent will prefer to be reelected.
The following Lemma describes the best winning policy choice of the
incumbent given the degree of political competition with the challenger.
Lemma 5 The incumbents best wining strategies are:
fy(L); x(L)g =
8><>:
fmax
n
ym   1 34(1 ) ; 0
o
; 0g if   1
3
fym; 3 14 g if 13    12
fmaxym   14 ; 0	 ; 12g if   12
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The relationship between the best winning electoral platform and  is
very intuitive: As competition on the electoral issue becomes tougher, i.e.
 goes up, the incumbent needs to select a platform closer to the median
voters ideal policy in order to win.
Perhaps more surprising is the non-monotonic e¤ect that the weight that
citizens put on the popular issue has on the best winning policy that the
incumbent can implement in that issue. When the popular issue is impor-
tant (low ) the incumbent is virtually facing no opposition. Citizens care
almost only about an issue in which the incumbent can act like a monopo-
list. Actually, when competition on the electoral issue is rather soft (  1
3
)
the incumbent can win by implementing her most preferred policy on the
electoral issue.
But as  becomes larger the incumbent cannot longer win the election by
implementing his ideal policy on the electoral issue. He can either please cit-
izens on the popular issue by implementing their proposed policy ym and in
return choose a policy close to her ideal one on the electoral one, or alterna-
tively he can pick the median voters ideal policy on the electoral dimension
and select a policy as close as possible to his own ideal one on the popular
issue. For intermediate levels of  the rst option is better because electoral
competition is relatively soft and he can implement a policy relatively close
to his ideal policy on the electoral issue and still win. That winning electoral
promise will be less favorable for the incumbent the tougher electoral com-
petition becomes, that is, the larger the value of : However, when electoral
competition is tough, i.e.  > 1
2
, the incumbent prefers the second option
and he compromises substantially on the electoral issue, and implements the
median voters ideal point. Hence, the incumbent will implement the citi-
zenspolicy proposal on the popular issue only when electoral competition
is neither too soft nor to tough.
Figure 2 depicts the incumbent´s winning strategy in both stages of the
game as a function of :
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Next we nd the incumbents best losing strategy and the corresponding
best response of the challenger.
Lemma 6 The incumbent best losing strategies are y(L) = 0 and x(L) =
1=2 which in turn implies that x(R) = 1
2
+ 1 
1+
ym:
If the incumbent decides to forgo reelection, the best strategy that he
can follow is to implement his preferred policy choice on the popular issue
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and force the challenger to become as moderate as possible in the electoral
one. In equilibrium, he announces the median voters ideal policy and the
challenger wins the election by announcing a platform that will be closer to
the median voter the higher the value of :
The last step of the analysis amounts to characterize when the incumbent
prefers to win the election given the best winning strategies and the best los-
ing strategies described above. His incentives to remain in o¢ ce will depend
on the level of disalignment with the population (simply measured by ym),
the relative weight that voters assign to the electoral issue, i.e. measured by
; and the value that the incumbent attaches to o¢ ce K:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium the incumbent wins
(i) When ym  14 for any K  0 and any 0    1:
(ii) When 1
4
 ym  38 if and only if K > max
n
2
1+
ym   14 ; 0
o
:
(iii) When ym  38 if and only if
K >
(
max
n
2
1+
ym +
5 3
4(1 ) ; 0
o
if   1
2
2
1+
ym   14 if   12
When the preferences of the incumbent on the popular issue are aligned
with those of society, i.e. ym  14 , the incumbent prefers to win for all values
of K and all values of : Otherwise, if the preferences of the incumbent on
the popular issue are not aligned with the policy proposal ym, the incumbent
may decide to forgo the reelection. In this case, he will do so only when he
is su¢ ciently policy motivated (for low enough values of K): The tougher
electoral competition is, i.e. the higher , the larger is the range of values
of K that induces the incumbent to forgo the election. Intuitively, the more
intense electoral competition is and the more costly is to please voters in the
popular issue, the more likely is that the incumbent will prefer to lose. The
area under the curves in Figure 3 corresponds to the region of the parameter
space where the incumbent is not reelected in equilibrium.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Incumbents that are highly policy motivated, i.e. have low values of K;
are more likely to su¤er a disadvantage from being in o¢ ce. They may
nd too costly to make a policy choice that will guarantee their reelection
when their preferences are not aligned with societys preferences. The cost of
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being reelected may also be too high when the degree of competition on the
electoral issue is high, i.e  close to 1. In that case, the incumbent will have
to propose a very moderate policy on the electoral issue if he wants to beat
the challenger. Otherwise, citizensproposals can be used by the incumbent
to obtain a decisive advantage in political competition and become reelected.
5 Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper is to study how electoral competition
unravels when the policy choice of the incumbent in a pre-election issue
factors into the citizensevaluation of his performance. We assumed that
the performance of the incumbent on that issue is assessed by the distance
between the policy proposed by citizens and the policy that the incumbent
nally implemented.
We have characterized conditions under which the incumbents can use this
pre-electoral issue to their advantage. In all these cases, the incumbent has
to adjust his policy choices in order to accommodate the policy proposals he
receives, and the nal policy outcome is relatively close to the policy outcome
most preferred by society. But this is not always the case. When the policy
proposals made by society are too far from the incumbents preferred policy,
the incumbent may decide to forgo reelection. In this case the nal policy
outcome is bad from voterspoint of view.
We have assumed that voters use an asymmetric rule in order to evaluate
the candidates. We identied two di¤erent kinds of asymmetries that had to
be taken into account: (1) only the incumbent is responsible for the policy
implemented on the popular issue, and (2) there is a policy proposal made
only on the popular issue. Thus, we have assumed that voters evaluate the
incumbent according to his performance on the two issues and the challenger
only according to the platform he announces in the electoral issue.
We could relax the assumption by which both candidates are evaluated
according to the two issues. The evaluation of the challenger with respect
to the popular issue would just become an exogenous parameter given that
the challenger cannot implement any policy during the legislature. This
parameter would represent the performance of the challenger in the popular
issues in the past. Our results would remain the same as long as the weight
that voters assign to the electoral issue when they evaluate the incumbent
is smaller than the one they use to evaluate the challenger. Otherwise the
incumbent would su¤er from a greater disadvantage but qualitatively our
results would still go through.
Our modelling of citizensevaluation rule constitutes a novel feature of
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our approach because it combines elements of both retrospective voting and
prospective voting. Voters use retrospective voting to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the incumbent with respect to the popular issues. And voters use
prospective voting to evaluate the campaign promises that candidates an-
nounce during the electoral campaign. In order to use all the information
available to them at the time of voting, voters combine these two di¤er-
ent kinds of evaluations. Votes make use of past information regardless of
whether past performance provides or not voters with information about
future choices. In our model, citizens are fundamentally unhappy with an
incumbent that deviated from the policy proposal they made to him during
his time in o¢ ce. This behavior in addition to the existence of such policy
proposals generate a potential electoral advantage to the incumbent. From
this point of view, and given that any electoral advantage comes from the
incumbents choices, the present model might be seen as a behavioral model
of endogenous valence.13
We have characterized conditions under which the disadvantages gener-
ated are compensated by the advantages. In all these cases, the incumbent
has to adjust his policy choices in order to accommodate the policy proposals
he receives, and the nal policy outcome is relatively close to the policy out-
come most preferred by society. But this is not always the case. When the
policy proposals made by society are too costly from the incumbents point
of view, the incumbent may decide to forgo reelection. In this case the nal
policy outcome is bad from voterspoint of view.
The model assumes that these policy proposals are exogenous. It could
be extended by making them endogenous. This issue was partially addressed
in Aragones and Sanchez-Pages (2009) for the case when the proposal comes
from popular assemblies and only the popular issue is relevant for voters, i.e.
 close to zero. Results above show that policy proposals that are not aligned
with the policy preferences of the incumbent will tend to be neglected. This
will be more likely to be the case as electoral competition becomes stronger.
Therefore, if policy proposals were endogenous, demands on the popular issue
that were aligned with the preferences of the incumbent would be satised
more likely when the intensity of electoral competition were intermediate.
Given this, it might be optimal for voters to submit policy demands that do
not put too much pressure on the incumbent.
13We thank Maggie Penn for this observation.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If x (L) = x (R) then   (1  ) jym   y (L)j  
 jxi   x (L)j    jxi   x (R)j becomes jym   y (L)j  jxi   x (R)j. Thus
L obtains votes from all i such that are at a distance from x(R) = x(L)
of at least jy (L)  ymj. This means that R obtains at most 2 jy (L)  ymj
votes, therefore L obtains at least 1   2 jy (L)  ymj votes. Notice that in
this case R obtains exactly 2 jy (L)  ymj if jy (L)  ymj  x (L) = x (R) 
1  jy (L)  ymj :
Proof of Lemma 2. First suppose that fy (L) ; x(L); x(R)g is an
equilibrium outcome such that x(R) = x(L). Then R cannot win because by
the previous lemma R at most can obtain 2 jy (L)  ymj < 1=2 votes.
Next suppose that fy (L) ; x(L); x(R)g is an equilibrium outcome such
that x(R) 6= x(L) and R wins. Then we must have
UL (y(L); x(L); x(R)) =  y(L)  x(R):
Consider that L chooses instead x0(L) = x(R). Then by the previous lemma
L obtains at least 1  2 jy (L)  ymj > 1=2 votes. Thus L wins and his utility
is
UL (y(L); x(R); x(R)) =  y(L) +K   x(R) >  y(L)  x(R);
In this case L prefers to win and has a winning strategy. Thus R cannot win
in equilibrium.
Now suppose that jy (L)  ymj > 1=2. If L is winning in equilibrium with
x(L) and x(R), then consider x0(R) such that x0(R) = x(L) and notice that
in this case R obtains more than half of the total vote. Thus R can win
the election in this using this strategy, and it is also optimal for R to do
so since he obtains an extra payo¤ of K and his deviation does not involve
any change in the policy implemented. The reason is that if x(L)  1=2
then R obtains a vote share equal to x(L) + min f1  x(L); jy (L)  ymjg
which is a majority. Similarly if x(L)  1=2 then R obtains 1   x(L) +
min fx(L); jy (L)  ymjg which is also a majority. Thus L cannot win in
equilibrium with jy (L)  ymj > 1=2.
Next suppose that jy (L)  ymj 2 (14 ; 12)
If x(L) 2 1
2
  jy (L)  ymj ; 12 + jy (L)  ymj

then R can defeat it with
x(R) = x(L). In this case R obtains a vote share of 2 jy (L)  ymj > 1=2
which allows R to win. R prefers to do so since by mimicking L he obtains
an extra payo¤ of K and his deviation does not involve any change in the
policy implemented.:
If x(L)  1
2
  jy (L)  ymj then R can defeat L with x (R) 2 (3 24 ; 34): To
show this, note that the set of supporters of R is the interval [x(R)+x(L)
1+
 
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1 
1+
jy (L)  ymj ; 1] whenever x (R) > (1  )(1  jy (L)  ymj) + x (L) : In
addition, this number of voters constitutes a majority if and only if x (R) <
1+
2
+ (1   ) jy (L)  ymj   x (L) : This denes an interval of platforms
that R can use to defeat L. Given the restrictions on jy (L)  ymj and the
assumption on x(L); this interval is at least as large as the interval (3 2
4
; 3
4
):
Hence, any platform in this interval guarantees R a victory against x(L): Note
again that R prefers to win rather than to let L win because, in addition to
obtaining K; the policy outcome is closer to his ideal point.
If x(L)  1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj then the best winning policy for R is x(R) =
x(L) + (1  )(1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj): We show this by following the same pro-
cedure as above to dene the set of Rs supporters and then check when it
constitutes a majority. Next we need to see whether R actually uses this
winning strategy. For this to be the case it need to hold that
K   1 + x(L) + (1  )(1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj) >  1 + x(L)
, x(L) < K
1   +
1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj :
Hence, L will not able to win with a x(L) in (1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj ; 1] if K >
(1  )(1
2
  jy (L)  ymj): If K < (1  )(12   jy (L)  ymj) we need to check
whether L prefers to win the election with such rightist policy. The best case
scenario for L if he wants to win is when x(L) = K
1  +
1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj :
In that case, his payo¤ is just  y(L)   
1 K   12   jy (L)  ymj : The best
case scenario for L if in the contrary he decides to lose is to set x(L) =
1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj given that that forces R to choose the same policy. His
payo¤ is just  y(L)  1
2
  jy (L)  ymj ; so he actually prefers to lose.
Proof of Lemma 3. From the previous proposition we know that
in this case L wins in equilibrium. Suppose that x(L) and x(R) is an
equilibrium outcome such that L wins and x(R) < x(L). Then we must have
UL (y(L); x(L); x(R)) =  y(L) +K   x(L): Consider that L chooses instead
x0(L) = x(R). Then by lemma 1 L obtains at least 1 2 jy (L)  y (A)j > 1=2
votes and his utility is UL (y(L); x(R); x(R)) =  y(L) +K   x(R):
Notice that UL (y(L); x(R); x(R)) =  y(L) +K   x(R) >  y(L) +K  
x(L) = UL (y(L); x(L); x(R)) since we assumed that x(R) < x(L): Thus,
x(L) and x(R) such that x(R) < x(L) cannot be part of an equilibrium
strategy and we must have x(L)  x(R):
Let us rst characterize the sets of voters that vote for candidate L given
y (L) ; x(L) and x(R):
The set of voters with xi < x (L) that vote for L is given by all xi such
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that
xi <
x (R)  x (L)
1     jy (L)  ymj  xi:
Similarly, the set of voters with xi > x (R) that vote for L is given by all
xi such that
xi >
x (R)  x (L)
1   + jy (L)  ymj  xi
Since by proposition 2 x(R) x(L)
1  > x (R) then we have that xi > x (R).
Notice that if xi < 0 then xi < 1 for all jy (L)  ymj < 12 :
Finally, the set of voters with x (L) < xi < x (R) that vote for L is given
by all xi such that
xi <
x (R) + x (L)
1 + 
  1  
1 + 
jy (L)  ymj  exi
Since by proposition 2 x(R)+x(L)
1+
< x (R) then we have that exi < x (R) <
xi. However, the comparison between xi and exi is not clear-cut. We have
that xi < exi < x(L) if and only if
x(R)  x(L) < (1  ) jy (L)  ymj :
Thus, two cases can emerge:
Case 1: If x(R) x(L)  (1 ) jy (L)  ymj then we have that the votes
that L obtains are given by exi +max f0; 1  xig :
Case 2: If x(R) x(L) < (1 ) jy (L)  ymj then we have that the votes
that L obtains are given by max

0; xi
	
+max f0; 1  xig :
Suppose in the rst place that x(L) = 0: Then the number of votes that
L receives are
#L =
8><>:
1  jy (L)  ymj   x(R)1  if x (R) < (1  ) jy (L)  ymj
1  2
1 2x(R)  21+ jy (L)  ymj if x (R) 2 [(1  ) jy (L)  ymj ; (1  )(1  jy (L)  ymj)]
x(R)
1+
  1 
1+
jy (L)  ymj if x (R) > (1  )(1  jy (L)  ymj)
that attains a minimum when x (R) = (1 )(1  jy (L)  ymj : The number
of votes in that case is greater than 1
2
if and only if
jy (L)  ymj  1  3
4(1  ) :
Note that if this holds, x(L) = 0 is a winning strategy for L: Otherwise,
there exists a platform x(R) that can defeat x(L) = 0:
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Second, suppose that 1 3
4(1 ) < jy (L)  ymj > 14 : Let us rst show that any
platform x(L) 2 (0; 3 1
4
+ 1 

jy (L)  ymj) can be defeated by x(R) = 3 4 :
First, note that we are in Case 1 since
x(R)  x(L) > (1  ) jy (L)  ymj , x(L) < 3  
4
  (1  ) jy (L)  ymj
and in addition we have by assumption that
x(L) <
3  1
4
+
1  

jy (L)  y (A)j < 3  
4
  (1  ) jy (L)  y (A)j
where the last inequality follows from simple algebra. One can also show
that our assumption on x(L) also implies that xi > 1 which means that the
number of votes obtained by L is just exi which in turn is smaller than 12 if
and only if
x (L) <
3  1
4
+
1  

jy (L)  ymj ;
which holds by assumption. Hence, L is defeated if he chooses a platform
in that interval. From the remainder, let us now show that x(L) = 3 1
4
+
1 

jy (L)  ymj is a dominant strategy.
Again case we have to consider two cases:
1. Suppose that x(R) > 3 1
4
  1 2

jy (L)  ymj : In that case, the number
of citizens who vote for the incumbent are given by min f1; xig  exi:We
need to consider two subcases depending on the value of the extremes
of this interval.
i: If xi > 1 then R gets 1  exi votes and wins the election if and only if
exi < 1
2
! x (R) < 3  
4
Since xi > 1 if and only if x (R) >
3 
4
then this case cannot arise.
ii: If xi < 1 then R gets xi   exi votes. This number of votes is greater
than 1
2
if and only if x (R) > 3 
4
. Since xi < 1 if and only if
x (R) < 3 
4
again this case is not possible.
2. Suppose instead that x(R) < 3 1
4
  1 2

jy (L)  ymj :This means nec-
essarily that xi < 1 and that the challenger collects votes in (maxf0; xig; xi):
We need to consider then two di¤erent subcases:
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i: If xi < 0 the challenger gets xi votes and wins if and only if x (R) 
1+
4
: But this leads to a contradiction because
1 + 
4
>
3  1
4
 1  
2

jy (L)  ymj , 1  
4(1 + )
>   jy (L)  ymj :
ii: If xi > 0 then R gets xi   xi = 2 jy (L)  ymj votes. So here R
cannot win either.
Thus R cannot win the election for any x(R) he may choose. Still, observe
that x(R) = 3 
4
is a dominant strategy for her.
Since we have shown that L wins in equilibrium when jy (L)  ymj  14 ,
we have that Ls most preferred best response is an equilibrium strategy.
Proof of Lemma 4. First, suppose that jy (L)  ymj > 1=2. If x(L) >
x(R) in equilibrium, consider x0(R) such that x0(R) = x(L) and notice that:
1) in this case R obtains more than jy (L)  ymj votes, that is, more than
half of the total; and 2) the equilibrium policy outcome is larger, therefore
better o¤ for R. Thus this is a protable deviation for R and it implies that
x(L) > x(R) cannot hold in equilibrium.
Since we know that in equilibrium x(L)  x(R) Rs best winning strategy
is dened by xi > 1 and exi < 12 :This implies that
xi =
x (R)  x (L)
1   + jy (L)  ymj > 1
and exi = x (R) + x (L)
1 + 
  1  
1 + 
jy (L)  ymj < 1
2
Thus the set of winnings strategies for R is dened by
(1  ) (1  jy (L)  ymj)+x (L) < x (R) < 1 + 
2
+(1  ) jy (L)  ymj x (L)
and among themR prefers the largest one x (R) = 1+
2
+(1  ) jy (L)  ymj 
x (L) :
The best response for L in this case is the largest possible value of x (L) :
So that Rs best response to it corresponds to its smallest possible value.
Since in equilibrium we need to have x(L)  x(R) then x(L)  1+
2
+
(1  ) jy (L)  ymj   x (L) implies x(L)  12 + 1 1+ jy (L)  ymj : Thus in
equilibrium x (L) = x(R) = 1
2
+ 1 
1+
jy (L)  ymj :
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Now suppose that 1=4 < jy (L)  ymj < 1=2. If x(L) 2

0; 1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj

then Rs best response, as in the previous proposition, is dened by xi > 1
and exi < 12 :
This implies that
xi =
x (R)  x (L)
1   + jy (L)  ymj > 1
and exi = x (R) + x (L)
1 + 
  1  
1 + 
jy (L)  ymj < 1
2
Thus the set of winnings strategies for R is dened by (1  ) (1  jy (L)  ymj)+
x (L) < x (R) < 1+
2
+ (1  ) jy (L)  ymj   x (L)
and among them R prefers x (R) = 1+
2
+ (1  ) jy (L)  ymj   x (L)
And the best response for L in this case is the largest possible value of
x (L) : Since in equilibrium we need to have x(L)  x(R) then x(L)  1+
2
+
(1  ) jy (L)  ymj   x (L) implies x(L)  12 + 1 1+ jy (L)  ymj : Thus for
x(L) 2 0; 1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj

Rs best response is x(R) = 1
2
+ 1 
1+
jy (L)  ymj :
Given that if x(L) 2 1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj ; 1

we have that Rs best response
is x(R) 2 1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj ; 1

, and for x(L) 2 0; 1
2
  jy (L)  ymj

we have
that Rs best response is x(R) = 1
2
+ 1 
1+
jy (L)  ymj < 12+ jy (L)  ymj ; this
implies that Ls optimal strategy will not be in

1
2
+ jy (L)  ymj ; 1

:
Therefore the equilibrium if 1
4
< jy (L)  ymj < 12 is given by x(L) =
x(R) = 1
2
+ 1 
1+
jy (L)  ymj :
Proof of Lemma 5. Let us start with the case when jy (L)  ymj 
1 3
4(1 ) :Notice that it can emerge if and only if   13 : In that case the in-
cumbents payo¤ is increasing with jy (L)  ymj so his most preferred value
of y (L) in this range corresponds to y (L) = ym   1 34(1 ) : We already know
from previous results that in this case that he will then set x(L) = 0
When 1 3
4(1 )  jy (L)  ymj  14 ; after plugging the incumbents equi-
librium platforms in the electoral issue, it is possible to rewrite his payo¤
as
UL =  ym +K   3  1
4
  1  2

jy (L)  ymj ; (2)
which is decreasing with jy (L)  ymj as long as   12 and increasing other-
wise. In the former case, Ls most preferred value of y (L) corresponds to the
minimal value of jy (L)  ymj in this range, that is, y (L) = max
n
ym   1 34(1 ) ; ym
o
:
Hence, if   1
3
he will set again y (L) = ym   1 34(1 ) (and then x(L) = 0)
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whereas if 1
3
   1
2
he must set y (L) = ym which in turn implies that
x(L) = 3 1
4
:
The third case occurs when   1
2
. Then (2) is increasing with jy (L)  ymj :
Thus while staying in this range his most preferred value of y (L) corresponds
to the one that maximizes jy (L)  ymj, that is, y (L) = ym   14 ; that from
previous results it implies x(L) = 1
2
:
Proof of Lemma 6. We know from previous results that if the incum-
bent decides to lose by setting jy (L)  ymj > 14 ; the challenger will win the
election and set x(R) = 1
2
+ 1 
1+
jy (L)  ymj : In that case, the incumbent
receives the payo¤
UL =  ym   1
2
  2
1 + 
jy (L)  ymj ;
which is increasing in jy (L)  ymj : Thus while staying in this range, his most
preferred value of y (L) corresponds to the one that maximizes jy (L)  ymj,
that is, y (L) = 0; which implies that the challengers best response in this
case is x(R) = 1
2
+ 1 
1+
ym.
Proof of Proposition 1. Previous results show that since ym < 14
implies that jy (L)  ymj < 14 then L prefers to win in this case.
If ym  14 ; if the incumbent decides to lose then he receives a payo¤ equal
to
UL =  1
2
  1  
1 + 
ym:
If the incumbent decides to use his best winnings strategy then he receives
a payo¤ equal to
when   1
3
his payo¤ boils down to
UL =  ym +K   3  1
4(1  ) if  
1
2
(3)
and
UL =  ym +K   1
4
if   1
2
(4)
Thus, when   1
2
he prefers to use his winning strategy as long as
 ym +K   14   12   1 1+ym; that is, for
K >
2
1 + 
ym   1
4
Notice that this value is strictly positive for all values of  2 [0; 1] as long
as ym > 38 : For
1
4
 ym  38 we will have that the incumbent will decide to
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use a winning strategy for all values of K whenever 2
1+
ym   14 > 0, that
is,  > 1
8ym 1 : Notice that the incumbent decides to win for all K whenever
ym =
1
4
. Furthermore, the incumbent always decides to forgo reelection for
some positive values of K whenever ym > 38 :
Similarly, when   1
2
he prefers to use his winning strategy as long as
 ym +K   3 14(1 )   12   1 1+ym; that is, for
K >
5  3
4(1  ) +
2
1 + 
ym;
Notice that this value is strictly negative for small values of  (in particu-
lar for all   1
3
): For those values the incumbent decides to win the election
for all K: The set of values of K for which the incumbent decides to use a
winning strategy is smaller for larger values of  in this area.
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Figure 2: Incumbent’s best winning strategies. 
  
 
 
 
K 
1 1/2  
ym- ¼ 
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ym > 3/8 
Figure 3 : Minimal values of K for which the incumbent prefers to use a winning 
strategy in equilibrium. 
